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Abstract
In this chapter, we discuss a leader-follower (also called Stackelberg) stochastic differential
game with asymmetric information. Here the word “asymmetric” means that the avail-
able information of the follower is some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader,
though they play as different roles in the classical literatures. Stackelberg equilibrium is
represented by the stochastic versions of Pontryagin’s maximum principle and verifica-
tion theorem with partial information. A linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic
differential game with asymmetric information is studied as applications. If some system
of Riccati equations is solvable, the Stackelberg equilibrium admits a state feedback
representation.
Keywords: backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), leader-follower stochastic
differential game, asymmetric information, stochastic filtering, linear-quadratic control,
Stackelberg equilibrium
1. Introduction
Throughout this chapter, we denote by Rn the Euclidean space of n-dimensional vectors, by
R
nd the space of n  d matrices, by Sn the space of n  n symmetric matrices. ; h i and ∣  ∣
denote the scalar product and norm in the Euclidean space, respectively. Τ appearing in the
superscripts denotes the transpose of a matrix. f x, f xx denote the partial derivative and twice
partial derivative with respect to x for a differentiable function f .
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1.1. Motivation
In practice, there are many problems which motivate us to study the leader-follower stochastic
differential games with asymmetric information. Here we present two examples.
Example 1.1: (Continuous time principal-agent problem) The principal contracts with the
agent to manage a production process, whose cumulative proceeds (or output) Yt evolve on
0;T½  as follows:
dYt ¼ Betdtþ σdW t þ ~σd ~W t, Y0 ¼ Y0 ∈R, (1)
where et ∈R is the agent’s effort choice, B represents the productivity of effort, and there are
two additive shocks (due to the two independent Brownian motions W, ~W ) to the output. The
proceeds of the production add to the principal’s asset yt, which earns a risk free return r, and
out of which he pays the agent st ∈R and withdraws his own consumption dt ∈R. Thus the
principal’s asset evolves as
dyt ¼ ryt þ Bet  st  dt
 
dtþ σdW t þ ~σd ~W t, y0 ¼ y0 ∈R, (2)
where y0 is the initial asset. The agent has his own wealthmt, out of which he consumes ct, thus
dmt ¼ rmt þ st  ct½ dtþ σdW t þ ~σd ~W t, m0 ¼ m0 ∈R, (3)
Thus, the agent earns the same rate of return r on his savings, gets income flows due to his
payment st, and draws down wealth to consume. In the above σ, ~σ,σ, ~σ are all constants. At the
terminal time T, the principal makes a final payment sT and the agent chooses consumption
based on this payment and his terminal wealth mT . In the above, we restrict yt, st, dt to be
nonnegative.
We consider an optimal implementable contract problem in the so-called “hidden savings”
information structure (Williams [1], also in Williams [2]). In this problem, the principal can
observe his asset yt and the agent’s initial wealth m0 but cannot monitor the agent’s effort et,
consumption ct, and wealth mt for t > 0. The principal must provide incentives for the agent to
put forth the desired amount of the effort. For any st, dt, the agent first chooses his effort e
∗
t and
consumption c∗t , such that his exponential preference
J1 e; c; s; dð Þ ¼ E 
ðT
0





dtþ erT sT þmTð Þ
 
(4)
is maximized. Here r > 0 is the discount rate and λ > 0 denotes the risk aversion parameter.




is called an implementable contract if it meets the recommended actions of
the principal’s, which is based on the principal’s observable wealth yt. Then, the principal
selects his payment s∗t and consumption d
∗
t to maximize his exponential preference
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J2 e
∗
; c∗; s; dð Þ ¼ E 
ðT
0
ert exp λdtð Þdtþ e
rT yT  sT
 	 
: (5)
Let F t denote the σ-algebra generated by Brownian motions Ws, ~W s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t. Intuitively, F t
contains all the information up to time t. Let G1, t contains the information available to the
agent, and G2, t contains the information available to the principal, up to time t respectively.




; c∗; s; dð Þ ¼ max
e, c
J1 e; c; s; dð Þ, (6)








; c∗; s; dð Þ, (7)
where s∗; d∗ð Þ is a G2, t-adapted process pair. This formulates a stochastic Stackelberg differen-
tial game with asymmetric information. In this setting, the agent is the follower and the
principal is the leader. Any process quadruple e∗; c∗; s∗; d∗ð Þ satisfying the above two equalities
is called a Stackelberg equilibrium. In Williams [1], a solvable continuous time principal-agent
model is considered under three information structures (full information, hidden actions, and
hidden savings) and the corresponding optimal contract problems are solved explicitly. But it
can not cover our model.
Example 1.2: (Continuous time manufacturer-newsvendor problem) Let D ð Þ be the demand
rate for a product in the market, which satisfies
dD tð Þ ¼ a μD tð Þ
 	
dtþ σdW tð Þ þ ~σ ~W tð Þ, D 0ð Þ ¼ d0 ∈R, (8)
where a,μ, σ, ~σ are constants. Suppose that the market is consisted with a manufacturer selling
the product to end users through a retailer. At time t, the retailer chooses an order rate q tð Þ for
the product and decides its retail price R tð Þ, and is offered a wholesale price w tð Þ by the
manufacturer. We assume that items can be salvaged at unit price S ≥ 0, and that items cannot
be stored, that is, they must be sold instantly or salvaged. The retailer will obtain an expected
profit
J1 q ð Þ;R ð Þ;w ð Þð Þ ¼ E
ðT
0
R tð Þ  Sð Þmin D tð Þ; q tð Þ½   w tð Þ  Sð Þq tð Þ½ dt: (9)
When the manufacturer has a fixed production cost per unit M ≥ 0, he will get an expected
profit
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J2 q ð Þ;R ð Þ;w ð Þð Þ ¼ E
ðT
0
w tð Þ Mð Þq tð Þ  Smax qt Dt; 0
  
dt: (10)
In the above, we assume that S < M ≤w tð Þ ≤R tð Þ.
Let F t denote the σ-algebra generated byW sð Þ, ~W sð Þ, 0 ≤ s ≤ t, which contains all the information
up to time t. At time t, let the information G1, t,G2, t available to the retailer and the manufacturer,
respectively, are both sub-σ-algebras of F t. Moreover, G1, t⊆G2, t. This can be explained from the
practical application’s aspect. Specifically, the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price w tð Þ at
time t, which is a G2, t-adapted stochastic process. And the retailer chooses an order rate q tð Þ and
a retail price R tð Þ at time t, which are G1, t-adapted stochastic processes. For any w ð Þ, to select a
G1, t-adapted process pair q
∗ ð Þ;R∗ ð Þð Þ for the retailer such that
J1 q
∗ ð Þ;R∗ ð Þ;w ð Þð Þ  J1 q
∗ ;w ð Þð Þ;R∗ ;w ð Þð Þ;w ð Þð Þ ¼ max
q ð Þ,R ð Þ
J1 q ð Þ;R ð Þ;w ð Þð Þ, (11)
and then to select a G2, t-adapted process w
∗ ð Þ for the manufacturer such that
J2 q
∗ ð Þ;R∗ ð Þ;w∗ ð Þð Þ  J2 q
∗ ;w∗ ð Þð Þ;R∗ ;w∗ ð Þð Þ;w∗ ð Þð Þ ¼ max
w ð Þ
J2 q
∗ ;w ð Þð Þ;R∗ ;w ð Þð Þ;w ð Þð Þ,
(12)
formulates a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. In this
setting, the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Any process triple
q∗ ð Þ;R∗ ð Þ;w∗ ð Þð Þ satisfying the above is called a Stackelberg equilibrium. In Øksendal et al.
[3], a time-dependent newsvendor problem with time-delayed information is solved, based on
stochastic differential game (with jump-diffusion) approach. But it cannot cover our model.
1.2. Problem formulation
Motivated by the examples earlier, in this chapter we study the leader-follower stochastic
differential games with asymmetric information. Let Ω;F ;ℙð Þ be a complete probability space.
W ð Þ; ~W ð ÞÞ

is a standard R2-valued Brownian motion and F tf g0 ≤ t ≤T be its natural aug-
mented filtration and FT ¼ F where T > 0 is a finite time duration. Let the state satisfy the
stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dxu1 ,u2 tð Þ ¼ b t; xu1,u2 tð Þ; u1 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þdtþ σ t; x
u1 ,u2 tð Þ; u1 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð ÞdW tð Þ
þ ~σ t; xu1 ,u2 tð Þ; u1 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þd ~W tð Þ, x
u1,u2 0ð Þ ¼ x0,
(
(13)
where u1 ð Þ and u2 ð Þ are control processes taken by the two players in the game, labeled 1 (the
follower) and 2 (the leader), with values in nonempty convex sets U1⊆R, U2⊆R, respectively.
xu1 ,u2 ð Þ, the solution to SDE Eq. (13) with values in R, is the state process with initial state
x0 ∈R
n. Here b t; x; u1; u2ð Þ : Ω 0;T½   RU1 U2 ! R, σ t; x; u1; u2ð Þ : Ω 0;T½   R
U1 U2 ! R, ~σ t; x; u1; u2ð Þ : Ω 0;T½   RU1 U2 ! R are given F t-adapted processes,
for each x; u1; u2ð Þ.
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Let us now explain the asymmetric information character between the follower (player 1) and
the leader (player 2) in this chapter. Player 1 is the follower, and the information available to
him at time t is based on some sub-σ-algebra G1, t⊆G2, t, where G2, t is the information available
to the leader. We assume in this and next sections that G1, t⊆G2, t⊆F t. We define the admissible
control sets of the follower and the leader, respectively, as follows.
Uk≔ ukjuk : Ω 0;T½  ! Uk is Gk, t  adapted and sup
0 ≤ t ≤T
E uk tð Þj j
i
< ∞; i ¼ 1; 2;⋯

 
, k ¼ 1, 2: (14)
The game initiates with the announcement of the leaders control u2 ð Þ∈U2. Knowing this, the
follower would like to choose a G1, t-adapted control u
∗
1 ð Þ ¼ u
∗
1 ; u2 ð Þð Þ to minimize his cost
functional




u1,u2 tð Þ; u1 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þdtþ G1 x
u1,u2 Tð Þð Þ
 
: (15)
Here g1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ : Ω 0;T½   RU1 U2 ! R is an F t-adapted process, and G1 xð Þ :
Ω R! R is an FT-measurable random variable, for each x; u1; u2ð Þ. Now the follower
encounters a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information.
SOCPF. For any chosen u2 ð Þ∈U2 by the leader, choose a G1, t-adapted control u
∗
1 ð Þ ¼
u∗1 ; u2 ð Þð Þ∈U1, such that
J1 u
∗








J1 u1 ð Þ; u2 ð Þð Þ, (16)
subject to Eqs. (13) and (15). Such a u∗1 ð Þ ¼ u
∗




,u2 ð Þ to Eq. (13) is called an optimal state.
In the following step, once knowing that the follower will take such an optimal control
u∗1 ð Þ ¼ u
∗
1 ; u2 ð Þð Þ, the leader would like to choose a G2, t-adapted control u
∗




















Here g2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ : Ω 0;T½   RU1 U2 ! R, G2 xð Þ : Ω R! R are given F t-adapted
processes, for each x; u1; u2ð Þ. Now the leader encounters a stochastic optimal control problem
with partial information.
SOCPL. Find a G2, t-adapted control u
∗
2 ð Þ∈U2, such that
J2 u
∗
















1 ; u2 ð Þð Þ; u2 ð Þ
 	
, (18)
subject to Eqs. (13) and (17). Such a u∗2 ð Þ is called an optimal control, and the corresponding




2 ð Þ to Eq. (13) is called an optimal state. We will rewrite the problem for
the leader in more detail in the next section. We refer to the problem mentioned above as a
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leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. If there exists a control








; u∗2 ð Þ
 	
satisfying Eqs. (16) and (18), we refer to it as a
Stackelberg equilibrium.
In this chapter, we impose the following assumptions.
(A1.1) For each ω∈Ω, the functions b,σ, ~σ, g1 are twice continuously differentiable in x; u1; u2ð Þ. For
each ω∈Ω, functions g2 and G1, G2 are continuously differentiable in x; u1; u2ð Þ and x, respectively.
Moreover, for each ω∈Ω and any t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∈ 0;T½   RU1 U2, there exists C > 0 such that
1þ jxj þ ju1j þ ju2jð Þ
1
∣ϕ t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣ϕx t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣ϕu1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣
þ∣ϕu2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣ϕxx t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣ϕu1u1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣ϕu2u2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣ ≤C,
(19)
for ϕ ¼ b, σ, ~σ, and
1þ xj j2
 1
∣G1 xð Þ∣þ 1þ jxjð Þ
1
∣G1x xð Þ∣þ 1þ xj j
2
 1
∣G2 xð Þ∣þ 1þ jxjð Þ
1
∣G2x xð Þ∣ ≤C,
1þ xj j2 þ u1j j
2 þ u2j j
2
 1
∣g1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ 1þ jxj þ ju1j þ ju2jð Þ
1ð∣g1x t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣g1u1 t; x;u1; u2ð Þ∣
þ ∣g1u2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣Þ þ ∣g1xx t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣g1u1u1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣g1u2u2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣ ≤C,
1þ xj j2 þ u1j j
2 þ u2j j
2
 1
∣g2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ 1þ jxj þ ju1j þ ju2jð Þ
1ð∣g2x t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣
þ ∣g2u1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣þ ∣g2u2 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ∣Þ ≤C:
(20)
1.3. Literature review and contributions of this chapter
Differential games are initiated by Issacs [4], which are powerful in modeling dynamic systems
where more than one decision-makers are involved. Differential games have been researched
by many scholars and have been applied in biology, economics, and finance. Stochastic differ-
ential games are differential games for stochastic systems involving noise terms. See Basar and
Olsder [5] for more information about differential games. Recent developments for stochastic
differential games can be seen in Hamadène [6], Wu [7], An and Øksendal [8], Wang and Yu
[9, 10], and the references therein.
Leader-follower stochastic differential game is the stochastic and dynamic formulation of the
Stackelberg game, which was introduced by Stackelberg [11] in 1934, when the concept of a
hierarchical solution for markets where some firms have power of domination over others, is
defined. This solution concept is now known as the Stackelberg equilibrium, which in the
context of two-person nonzero-sum games, involves players with asymmetric roles, one leader
and one follower. Pioneer study for stochastic Stackelberg differential games can be seen in
Basar [12]. Specifically, a leader-follower stochastic differential game begins with the follower
aims at minimizing his cost functional in response to the leader’s decision on the whole
duration of the game. Anticipating the follower’s optimal decision depending on his entire
strategy, the leader selects an optimal strategy in advance to minimize his cost functional,
based on the stochastic Hamiltonian system satisfied by the follower’s optimal decision. The
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pair of the leader’s optimal strategy and the follower’s optimal response is known as the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
A linear-quadratic (LQ) leader-follower stochastic differential game was studied by Yong [13] in
2002. The coefficients of the the cost functionals and system are random, the diffusion term of the
state equation contain the controls, and the weight matrices for the controls in the cost functionals
are not necessarily positive definite. The related Riccati equations are derived to give a state
feedback representation of the Stackelberg equilibrium in a nonanticipating way. Bensoussan
et al. [14] obtained the global maximum principles for both open-loop and closed-loop stochastic
Stackelberg differential games, whereas the diffusion term does not contain the controls.
In this chapter, we study a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric
information. Our work distinguishes itself from these mentioned above in the following
aspects. (1) In our framework, the information available to the follower is based on some sub-
σ-algebra of that available to the leader. Moreover, both information filtration available to the
leader and the follower could be sub-σ-algebras of the complete information filtration natu-
rally generated by the random noise source. This gives a new explanation for the asymmetric
information feature between the follower and the leader, and endows our problem formula-
tion more practical meanings in realty. (2) Our work is established in the context of partial
information, which is different from that of partial observation (see e.g., Wang et al. [15]) but
related to An and Øksendal [8], Huang et al. [16], Wang and Yu [10]. (3) An important class of
LQ leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information is proposed and
then completely solved, which is a natural generalization of that in Yong [13]. It consists of a
stochastic optimal control problem of SDE with partial information for the follower, and
followed by a stochastic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential
equation (FBSDE) with complete information for the leader. This problem is new in differential
game theory and have considerable impacts in both theoretical analysis and practical meaning
with future application prospect, although it has intrinsic mathematical difficulties. (4) The
Stackelberg equilibrium of this LQ problem is characterized in terms of the forward-backward
stochastic differential filtering equations (FBSDFEs) which arises naturally in our setup. These
FBSDFEs are new and different from those in [10, 16]. (5) The Stackelberg equilibrium of this
LQ problem is explicitly given, with the help of some new Riccati equations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we solve our problem to find the
Stackelberg equilibrium. In Section 3, we apply our theoretical results to an LQ problem.
Finally, Section 4 gives some concluding remarks.
2. Stackelberg equilibrium
2.1. The Follower’s problem
In this subsection, we first solve SOCPF. For any chosen u2 ð Þ∈U2, let u
∗
1 ð Þ be an optimal
control for the follower and the corresponding optimal state be xu
∗
1 ,u2 ð Þ. Define the Hamilto-
nian function H1 : Ω 0;T½   RU1 U2  R R R! R as
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H1 t; x; u1; u2; q; k;~k
 
¼ qb t; x; u1; u2ð Þ þ kσ t; x; u1; u2ð Þ þ ~k~σ t; x; u1; u2ð Þ  g1 t; x; u1; u2ð Þ: (21)
Let an F t-adapted process triple q ð Þ; k ð Þ;~k ð Þ
 
∈R R R satisfies the adjoint BSDE
dq tð Þ ¼ bxðt; x
u∗1 ,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞq tð Þ þ σxðt; x





,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞ
~k tð Þ  g1xðt; x
u∗
1
,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞ
o
dt
 k tð ÞdW tð Þ  ~k tð Þd ~W tð Þ, q Tð Þ ¼ G1x x






Proposition 2.1 Let (A1.1) hold. For any given u2 ð Þ∈U2, let u
∗
1 ð Þ be the optimal control for SOCPF,
and xu
∗
1 ,u2 ð Þ be the corresponding optimal state. Let q ð Þ; k ð Þ;~k ð Þ
 
be the adjoint process triple. Then
we have
E H1u1 t; x
u∗
1
,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ; u2 tð Þ; q tð Þ; k tð Þ;
~k tð Þ
 
; u1  u
∗
1 tð Þ
D EG1, th i ≥ 0, a:e:t∈ 0;T½ , a:s:, (23)
holds, for any u1 ∈U1.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.1 of [10], we can get the result.
Proposition 2.2 Let (A1.1) hold. For any given u2 ð Þ, let u
∗
1 ð Þ∈U1 and x
u∗
1
,u2 ð Þ be the correspon-
ding state. Let q ð Þ; k tð Þ;~k ð Þ
 
be the adjoint process triple. For each t;ωð Þ∈ 0;T½  Ω, H1
t; ; ; u2 tð Þ; q tð Þ; k tð Þ;~k tð Þ
 
is concave, G1 ð Þ is convex, and
E H1ðt; x
u∗1 ,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ;u2 tð Þ; q tð Þ; k tð Þ;










holds for a:e:t∈ 0;T½ , a.s. Then u∗1 ð Þ is an optimal control for SOCPF.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3 of [10], we can obtain the result.
2.2. The Leader’s problem
In this subsection, we first state the SOCPL. Then, we give the maximum principle and
verification theorem. For any u2 ð Þ∈U2, by Eq. (23), we assume that a functional u
∗
1 tð Þ ¼
u∗1 t;bxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ; bu2 tð Þ;bq tð Þ;bk tð Þ;b~k tð Þ  is uniquely defined, where
bxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ≔E xu∗1 ,u2 tð ÞjG1, t ,bu2 tð Þ≔E u2 tð ÞjG1, t½ ,bq tð Þ≔E q tð ÞjG1, t½ ,bk tð Þ≔E k tð ÞjG1, t½ ,b~k tð Þ≔E ~k tð ÞjG1, th i: (25)
For the simplicity of notations, we denote xu2 ð Þ  xu
∗
1
,u2 ð Þ and define ϕL onΩ 0;T½  RU2
as ϕL t; xu2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þ≔ϕ t; x
u∗1 ,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 t;bxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ; bu2 tð Þ;bq tð Þ;bk tð Þ;~k tð Þ ; u2 tð Þ , for ϕ ¼ b, σ, ~σ, g1,
respectively. Then after substituting the above control process u∗1 ð Þ into Eq. (22), the leader
encounters the controlled FBSDE system
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dxu2 tð Þ ¼ bL t; xu2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þdtþ σ
L t; xu2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð ÞdW tð Þ þ ~σ
L t; xu2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þð Þd ~W tð Þ,
dq tð Þ ¼ bLxðt; x
u2 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞq tð Þ þ σ
L
xðt; x
u2 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞk tð Þ þ ~σ
L
xðt; x
u2 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞ~k tð Þ
n
gL1xðt; x
u2 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞ
o
dt k tð ÞdW tð Þ  ~k tð Þd ~W tð Þ, xu2 0ð Þ ¼ x0, q Tð Þ ¼ G1x x




Note that Eq. (26) is a controlled conditional mean-field FBSDE, which now is regarded as the
“state” equation of the leader. That is to say, the state for the leader is the quadruple
xu2 ð Þ; q ð Þ; k ð Þ;~k ð Þ
 
.
Remark 2.1 The equality u∗1 tð Þ ¼ u
∗
1 t;bxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ; bu2 tð Þ;bq tð Þ;bk tð Þ;b~k tð Þ  does not hold in general.
However, for LQ case, it is satisfied and we will make this point clear in the next section.
Define
JL2 u2 ð Þð Þ≔J2 u
∗






u∗1 ,u2 tð Þ; u∗1 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞdtþ G2 x












u2 tð Þ; u2 tð ÞÞdtþ G2 x




where gL2 : Ω 0;T½   RU2 ! R. Note the cost functional of the leader is also conditional
mean-field’s type. We propose the stochastic optimal control problem with partial information
of the leader as follows.
SOCPL. Find a G2, t-adapted control u
∗







JL2 u2 ð Þð Þ, (28)
subject to Eqs. (26) and (27). Such a u∗2 ð Þ is called an optimal control, and the corresponding
solution x∗ ð Þ  xu
∗
2 ð Þ to Eq. (26) is called an optimal state process for the leader.
Let u∗2 ð Þ be an optimal control for the leader, and the corresponding state
x∗ ð Þ; q∗ ð Þ; k∗ ð Þ; ~k∗ ð Þ
 
is the solution to Eq. (26). Define the Hamiltonian function of the
leader H2 : Ω 0;T½   R
n U2  R R R R R R R R! R as
H2 t; x
u2
; u2; q; k;~k; y; z;~z; p
 
¼ ybL t; xu2 ; u2ð Þ þ zσ
L t; xu2 ; u2ð Þ þ ~z~σ
L t; xu2 ; u2ð Þ
þgL2 t; x
u2




















Let ϕL∗ tð Þ  ϕL t; x∗ tð Þ;bx∗ tð Þ; u∗2 tð Þ; bu∗2 tð Þ 	 for ϕ ¼ b,σ, ~σ, g1, g2 and all their derivatives. Sup-
pose that y ð Þ; z ð Þ;~z ð Þ; p ð ÞÞ∈R R R Rð is the unique F t-adapted solution to the adjoint
conditional mean-field FBSDE of the leader
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dp tð Þ ¼ bL∗x tð Þp tð Þ þ E½b
L∗bx tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
n o
dtþ σL∗x tð Þp tð Þ þ E½σ
L∗bx tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
n o
dW tð Þ
þ ~σL∗x tð Þp tð Þ þ E½~σ
L∗bx tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
n o
d ~W tð Þ, p 0ð Þ ¼ 0,
dy tð Þ ¼ bL∗x tð Þy tð Þ þ E½b
L∗bx tð Þy tð ÞjG1, t þ σL∗x tð Þz tð Þ þ E½σL∗bx tð Þz tð ÞjG1, t
n
þ~σL∗x tð Þ~z tð Þ þ E ~σ
L∗bx tð Þ~z tð ÞjG1, t
h i
 bL∗xx tð Þq
∗ tð Þp tð Þ  E bL∗
xbxq∗ tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
h i
σL∗xx tð Þk tð Þp tð Þ  E σ
L∗
xbx tð Þk tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
h i
 ~σL∗xx tð Þ
~k tð Þp tð Þ  E σL∗
xbx tð Þ~k tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t
h i
þ gL∗1xx tð Þp tð Þ þ E½g
L∗
1xbx tð Þp tð ÞjG1, t þ gL∗2x tð Þ þ E½gL∗2bx tð ÞjG1, t
o
dt z tð ÞdW tð Þ  ~z tð Þd ~W tð Þ,
y Tð Þ ¼ G1xx x
∗ Tð Þð Þp Tð Þ þ G2x x




Now, we have the following two results.
Proposition 2.3 Let (A1.1) hold. Let u∗2 ð Þ∈U2 be an optimal control for SOCPL and
x∗ ð Þ; q∗ ð Þ; k∗ ð Þ; ~k∗ ð Þ
 
be the optimal state. Let y ð Þ; z ð Þ;~z ð Þ; p ð ÞÞð be the adjoint quadruple, then
E H2u2ðt; x
∗ tð Þ; u∗2 tð Þ; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ;~k
∗





∗ tð Þ; u∗2 tð Þ; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ; ~k∗ tð Þ; y tð Þ; z tð Þ;~z tð Þ; p tð ÞÞjG1, t; bu2  bu∗2 tð Þ
D EG2, t
i
≥ 0, a:e:t∈ 0;T½ , a:s:, for any u2 ∈U2:
(31)
Proof The maximum condition Eq. (31) can be derived by convex variation and adjoint tech-
nique, as Anderson and Djehiche [17]. We omit the details for saving space. See also Li [18],
Yong [19] and the references therein for mean-field stochastic optimal control problems. □
Proposition 2.4 Let (A1.1) hold. Let u∗2 ð Þ∈U2 and x
∗ ð Þ; q∗ ð Þ; k∗ ð Þ; ~k∗ ð Þ
 
be the corresponding
state, with G1xx xð Þ  G1 ∈S
n. Let y ð Þ; z ð Þ;~z ð Þ; p ð ÞÞð be the adjoint quadruple. For each t;ωð Þ∈
0;T½  Ω, suppose that H2 t; ; ; ; ; ; y tð Þ; z tð Þ;~z tð Þ; p tð ÞÞð and G2 ð Þ are convex, and
E H2ðt; x
∗ tð Þ; u∗2 tð Þ; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ; ~k
∗
tð Þ; y tð Þ; z tð Þ;~z tð Þ; p tð ÞÞ
h
þE½H2ðt; x
∗ tð Þ; u∗2 tð Þ; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ; ~k
∗






∗ tð Þ; u2; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ; ~k∗ tð Þ; y tð Þ; z tð Þ;~z tð Þ; p tð ÞÞ
h
þE½H2ðt; x
∗ tð Þ; u2; q
∗ tð Þ; k∗ tð Þ; ~k
∗




, a:e:t∈ 0;T½ , a:s:
(32)
Then u∗2 ð Þ is an optimal control for SOCPL.
Proof This follows similar to Shi [20]. We omit the details for simplicity. □
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3. Applications to LQ case
In order to illustrate the theoretical results in Section 2, we study an LQ leader-follower
stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. In this section, we let G1, t≔
σ
~W s; 0 ≤ s ≤ t
 
and G2, t ¼ F t. This game is a special case of the one in Section 2, but the
resulting deduction is very technically demanding. We split this section into two subsections,
to deal with the problems of the follower and the leader, respectively.
3.1. Problem of the follower
Suppose that the state xu1 ,u2 ∈R satisfies a linear SDE
dxu1,u2 tð Þ ¼ Axu1 ,u2 tð Þ þ B1u1 tð Þ þ B2u2 tð Þ½ dtþ Cx
u1,u2 tð Þ þD1u1 tð Þ þD2u2 tð Þ½ dW tð Þ
þ ~Cxu1,u2 tð Þ þ ~D1u1 tð Þ þ ~D2u2 tð Þd ~W tð Þ,




Here, u1 is the follower’s control process and u2 is the leader’s control process, which take
values both in R; A,C, ~C, B1, D1, ~D1, B2, D2, ~D2 are constants. In the first step, for announced u2,
the follower would like to choose a G1, t-adapted, square-integrable control u
∗
1 to minimize the
cost functional











u1,u2 Tð Þj j2
 
: (34)
In the second step, knowing that the follower would take u∗1, the leader wishes to choose an























 2 , (35)
where Q1, Q2, G1, G2 ≥ 0, N1 ≥ 0, N2 > 0 are constants. This is an LQ leader-follower stochastic






Define the Hamiltonian function of the follower as
H1 t; x; u1; u2; q; k;~k
 













For given control u2, suppose that there exists a G1, t-adapted optimal control u
∗
1 of the follower,
and the corresponding optimal state is xu
∗
1 ,u2 . By Proposition 2.1, Eq. (36) yields that





1 tð Þ  B1bq tð Þ D1bk tð Þ  ~D1b~k tð Þ, (37)
where the F t-adapted process triple q; k;~k
 
∈R R R satisfies the BSDE
dq tð Þ ¼ Aq tð Þ þ Ck tð Þ þ ~C~k tð Þ Q1x
u∗1 ,u2 tð Þ
h i
dt k tð ÞdW tð Þ  ~k tð Þd ~W tð Þ,






We wish to obtain the state feedback form of u∗1. Noting the terminal condition of Eq. (38) and
the appearance of u2, we set
q tð Þ ¼ P tð Þxu
∗
1 ,u2 tð Þ  φ tð Þ, t∈ 0;T½ , (39)
for some deterministic and differentiable R-valued function P tð Þ, and R-valued, F t-adapted
process φ which admits the BSDE
dφ tð Þ ¼ α tð Þdtþ β tð Þd ~W tð Þ, φ Tð Þ ¼ 0: (40)
In the above equation, α∈R, β∈R are F t-adapted processes, which are to be determined later.
Now, applying Itô’s formula to Eq. (39), we have
dq tð Þ ¼ _P tð Þxu
∗
1 ,u2 tð Þ þ P tð ÞAxu
∗
1
,u2 tð Þ þ α tð Þ þ P tð ÞB1u
∗
1 tð Þ þ P tð ÞB2u2 tð Þ
 
dt
þ P tð Þ Cxu
∗
1
,u2 tð Þ þD1u
∗
1 tð Þ þD2u2 tð Þ
 
dW tð Þ
þ P tð Þ ~Cxu
∗
1 ,u2 tð Þ þ ~D1u
∗
1 tð Þ þ
~D2u2 tð Þ þ β tð Þ
 
d ~W tð Þ:
 (41)
Comparing Eq. (41) with Eq. (38), we arrive at
k tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ Cxu
∗
1
,u2 tð Þ þD1u
∗
1 tð Þ þD2u2 tð Þ
 
,
~k tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ ~Cxu
∗
1
,u2 tð Þ þ ~D1u
∗
1 tð Þ þ
~D2u2 tð Þ  β tð Þ,
 (42)
and




1 ,u2 tð Þ  Aφ tð Þ  P tð ÞB1u
∗
1 tð Þ  P tð ÞB2u2 tð Þ þ Ck tð Þ þ
~C~k tð Þ,
(43)
respectively. Taking E jG1, t½  on both sides of Eqs. (39) and (42), we get
bq tð Þ ¼ P tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ  bφ tð Þ, (44)
and
bk tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ Cbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þD1u∗1 tð Þ þD2bu2 tð Þh i,
b~k tð Þ ¼ P tð Þ ~Cbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~D1u∗1 tð Þ þ ~D2bu2 tð Þ
 
 bβ tð Þ, (45)
Game Theory - Applications in Logistics and Economy106
respectively. Applying Lemma 5.4 in [21] to Eqs. (33) and (38) corresponding to u∗1, we derive
the optimal filtering equation
dbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ ¼ Abxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ B1u∗1 tð Þ þ B2bu2 tð Þh idtþ ~Cbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~D1u∗1 tð Þ þ ~D2bu2 tð Þh id ~W tð Þ,
dbq tð Þ ¼ Abq tð Þ þ Cbk tð Þ þ ~C~^k tð Þ Q1bxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ
 
dt ~k tð Þd ~W tð Þ,




Note that Eq. (46) is not a classical FBSDFE, since the generator of the BSDE depends on an
additional process bk. For given u2, it is important if Eq. (46) admits a unique G1, t-adapted
solution bxu∗1 , u^2 ;bq;bk;b~k . We will make it clear soon. For this target, first, by Eq. (37) and
supposing that.
(A2.1) ~N1 tð Þ≔N1 þD
2
1P tð Þ þ
~D21P tð Þ > 0, ∀t∈ 0;T½ ,
we immediately arrive at
u∗1 tð Þ ¼ 
~N11 tð Þ
~S1 tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~S tð Þbu2 tð Þ þ B1bφ tð Þ þ ~D1bβ tð Þh i, (47)




. Substituting Eq. (47) into
Eq. (43), we can obtain that if
_P tð Þ þ 2Aþ C2 þ ~C2
 	









P tð Þ2 þQ1 ¼ 0,




admits a unique differentiable solution P tð Þ, then














u∗1 , u^2 tð Þ  Aφ tð Þ þ ~S1 tð Þ ~N
1
1 tð ÞB1bφ tð Þ
~S2 tð Þu2 tð Þ þ ~S1 tð Þ ~N
1
1 tð Þ
~S tð Þbu2 tð Þ  ~Cβ tð Þ þ ~S1 tð Þ ~N11 tð Þ ~D1bβ tð Þ,
(49)
where ~S2 tð Þ≔ B2 þ CD2 þ ~C ~D2ÞP tð Þ

. By (A2.1), we know that Eq. (48) admits a unique solution
P tð Þ > 0 from standard Riccati equation theory [22]. In particular, if ~C ¼ ~D1 ¼ 0, Eq. (48)
reduces to
_P tð Þ þ 2Aþ C2
 	





P tð Þ2 þQ1 ¼ 0,
P Tð Þ ¼ G1, N1 þD
2
1P tð Þ > 0,
8<
: (50)
which recovers the standard one in [22]. With Eq. (49), the BSDE Eq. (40) takes the form
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1 tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ Aφ tð Þ  ~S1 tð Þ ~N11 tð ÞB1bφ tð Þ





β tð Þ þ ~S2 tð Þu2 tð Þ  ~S1 tð Þ ~N
1
1 tð Þ
~S tð Þbu2 tð Þdt β tð Þd ~W tð Þ,




Moreover, for given u2, plugging Eq. (47) into the forward equation of Eq. (46), and letting




~~C tð Þ≔~C  ~D1 ~N
1
1 tð Þ




~F1 tð Þ≔ B1 ~N
1
1 tð ÞB1,
~B1 tð Þ≔ B1 ~N
1
1 tð Þ












dbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ ¼ ~A tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~F1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~B2 tð Þbu2 tð Þh idt
þ ~~C tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~F3 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~~D2 tð Þbu2 tð Þ
 
d ~W tð Þ, bxu∗1 , u^2 0ð Þ ¼ x0,
8><
>: (53)
which admits a unique G1, t-adapted solution bxu∗1 , u^2 , for given bφ;bβ . Applying Lemma 5.4 in
[21] to Eq. (51) again, we have
dbφ tð Þ ¼ ~A tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~~C tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~F4 tð Þbu2 tð Þh idt bβ tð Þd ~W tð Þ, bφ Tð Þ ¼ 0, (54)
where ~F4 tð Þ≔~S2 tð Þ  ~S1 tð Þ ~N
1
1 tð Þ
~S tð Þ. For given bu2, Eq. (54) admits a unique solution bφ;bβ 
from standard BSDE theory. Putting Eqs. (53) and (54) together, we get
dbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ ¼ ~A tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~F1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~B2 tð Þbu2 tð Þh idt
þ
~~C tð Þbxu∗1 , u^2 tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~F3 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~~D2 tð Þbu2 tð Þh id ~W tð Þ,




which admits a unique G1, t-adapted solution bxu∗1 , u^2 ; bφ;bβ . By Eqs. (55), (44), (45), and (47), we
can uniquely obtain the solvability of Eq. (46). Moreover, we can check that the convexity/
concavity conditions in Proposition 2.2 hold, and u∗1 given by Eq. (47) is really optimal. We
summarize the above procedure in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (A2.1) hold, P tð Þ satisfy Eq. (48). For chosen u2 of the leader, u
∗
1 given by Eq. (47) is
the optimal control of the follower, where bxu∗1 , u^2 ; bφ;bβ  is the unique G1, t-adapted solution to Eq. (55).
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3.2. Problem of the leader
Since the leader knows that the follower will take u∗1 by Eq. (47), the state equation of the leader
writes
dxu2 tð Þ ¼ Axu2 tð Þ þ ~A tð Þ  A
 bxu^2 tð Þ þ ~F1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ B2u2 tð Þ þ ~B2 tð Þ  B2 	bu2 tð Þh idt
þ Cxu2 tð Þ þ ~F5 tð Þbxu^2 tð Þ þ ~~B1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~~D1 tð Þbβ tð Þ þD2u2 tð Þ þ ~F2 tð Þbu2 tð Þh idW tð Þ
þ ~Cxu2 tð Þ þ
~~C tð Þ  ~C
 bx u^2 tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~F3 tð Þbβ tð Þ þ ~D2u2 tð Þ þ ~~D2 tð Þ  ~D2 bu2 tð Þh id ~W tð Þ,




where xu2  xu
∗




~S1 tð Þ, ~F2 tð Þ≔D1 ~N
1
1 tð Þ
~S tð Þ. Noting that Eq. (56) is a decoupled conditional
mean-field FBSDE, its solvability for F t-adapted solution x
u2
; bφ;bβ  can be easily guaranteed.
The problem of the leader is to choose an F t-adapted optimal control u
∗
2 such that the cost
functional











u2 Tð Þj j2
 
(57)
is minimized. Define the Hamiltonian function of the leader as
H2 t; x
u2
; u2; bφ;bβ; y; z;~z; p  ¼ 1
2
Q2 x
u2j j2 þN2 u2j j
2
 
þ y Axu2 þ ~A tð ÞA
 bxu^2 þ ~F1 tð Þbφ þ ~B1 tð Þbβ þ B2u2 þ ~B2 tð Þ  B2bu2
 
þ p ~A tð Þbφ þ ~~C tð Þbβ þ ~F4 tð Þbu2 þ z Cxu2 þ ~F5 tð Þbxu^2 þ ~~B1 tð Þbφ þ ~~D1 tð Þbβ þD2u2 þ ~F2 tð Þbu2 
þ~z ~Cxu2 þ
~~C tð Þ  ~C




Suppose that there exists an F t-adapted optimal control u
∗
2 of the leader, and the corresponding
optimal state is x∗; bφ∗;bβ∗   xu∗2 ; bφ∗;bβ∗ . Then by Propositions 2.3, 2.4, Eq. (58) yields that
0 ¼ N2u
∗
2 tð Þ þ
~F4 tð Þbp tð Þ þ B2y tð Þ þ ~B2 tð Þ  B2 	by tð Þ þD2z tð Þ þ ~F2 tð Þbz tð Þ þ ~D2 tð Þ~z tð Þ þ ~~D2 tð Þ  ~D2 ~z tð Þ,
(59)
where the F t-adapted process p; y; z;~zð Þ satisfies
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dp tð Þ ¼ ~A tð Þp tð Þ þ ~F1 tð Þy tð Þ þ
~~B1 tð Þz tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þ~z tð Þ
h i
dt
þ ~~C tð Þp tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þy tð Þ þ
~~D1 tð Þz tð Þ þ ~F3 tð Þ~z tð Þ
h i
d ~W tð Þ,
dy tð Þ ¼ Ay tð Þ þ ~A tð Þ  A
 by tð Þ þ Cz tð Þ þ ~F5 tð Þbz tð Þ þ ~C~z tð Þ þ ~~C tð Þ  ~C ~z tð Þ þQ2x∗ tð Þh idt





In fact, the problem of the leader can also be solved by a direct calculation of the derivative of
the cost functional. Without loss of generality, let x0  0, and set u
∗
2 þ εu2 for e > 0 sufficiently
small, with u2 ∈R. Then it is easy to see from the linearity of Eqs. (56) and (60), that the solution
to Eq. (56) is x∗ þ exu2 . We first have











∗ tð Þ þ exu2 tð Þð Þ; x∗ tð Þ þ exu2 tð Þh i
þ N2 u
∗
2 tð Þ þ eu2 tð Þ
 	


















∗ tð Þ; xu2 tð Þh i þ N2u
∗
2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þ
  
dtþ E G2x
∗ Tð Þ; xu2 Tð Þh i: (62)





∗ tð Þ; xu2 tð Þh i þ N2u
∗
2 tð Þ; u2 tð Þ
  
dtþ E y Tð Þ; xu2 Tð Þh i: (63)











~A tð Þ  A
 
y tð Þ þ ~F5 tð Þz tð Þ þ
~~C tð Þ  ~C
 






2 tð Þ þ B2y tð Þ þD2z tð Þ þ








y tð Þ þ ~F2 tð Þz tð Þ þ
~~D2 tð Þ  ~D2
 





∗ tð Þ þ Ay tð Þ þ ~A tð Þ  A




~F1 tð Þy tð Þ þ
~~B1 tð Þz tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þ~z tð Þ; bφ tð ÞD Edtþ E
ðT
0
~B1 tð Þy tð Þ þ




p tð Þ; ~A tð Þbφ tð Þ þ ~~C tð Þbβ tð ÞD Edt E ðT
0




bβ tð Þ; ~~C tð Þp tð Þ þ ~B1 tð Þy tð Þ þ ~~D1 tð Þz tð Þ þ ~F3 tð Þ~z tð ÞD Edtþ E
ðT
0






2 tð Þ þ B2y tð Þ þD2z tð Þ þ






~B2 tð Þ  B2
 	
y tð Þ þ ~F2 tð Þz tð Þ þ
~~D2 tð Þ  ~D2
 
~z tð Þ; bu2 tð ÞD Edtþ E
ðT
0






2 tð Þ þ
~F4 tð Þbp tð Þ þ B2y tð Þ þ ~B2 tð Þ  B2 	by tð Þ þD2z tð Þ þ ~F2 tð Þbz tð Þ
þ ~D2 tð Þ~z tð Þ þ
~~D2 tð Þ  ~D2
 
~z tð Þ, u2 tð Þ〉dt:
(64)
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This implies Eq. (59).
In the following, we wish to obtain a “nonanticipating” representation for the optimal controls
u∗2 and u
∗
1. For this target, let us regard x
∗

















and (suppressing some t below)
A1≔
A 0
0 ~A tð Þ
 !
,A2≔
~A tð Þ  A 0
0 0
0@ 1A, ~B1≔ 0 ~B1 tð Þ
~B1 tð Þ 0
0@ 1A, ~~B1≔ 0 0








~B2 tð Þ  B2
0









~~C tð Þ  ~C 0
0 0
0@ 1A, ~~D1≔ 0 ~~D1 tð Þ
0 0
0@ 1A, ~D2≔ ~D2
0












0 ~F1 tð Þ
~F1 tð Þ 0
0@ 1A, ~F 2≔ ~F2 tð Þ
0





0 ~F3 tð Þ
~F3 tð Þ 0




~F5 tð Þ 0
0 0






With the notations, Eq. (56) with Eq. (60) is rewritten as
dX tð Þ ¼ A1X tð Þ þA2bX tð Þ þ ~F 1Y tð Þ þ ~~B1Z tð Þ þ ~B1~Z tð Þ þ B2w∗ tð Þ þ ~B2bu∗2 tð Þ dt
þ C1X tð Þ þ ~F 5bX tð Þ þ ~~BΤ1Y tð Þ þ ~~D1~Z tð Þ þD2w∗ tð Þ þ ~F 2bu∗2 tð Þ dW tð Þ
þ ~C1X tð Þ þ ~C2bX tð Þ þ ~BΤ1Y tð Þ þ ~~DΤ1Z tð Þ þ ~F 3~Z tð Þ þ ~D2w∗ tð Þ þ ~~D2bu∗2 tð Þ d ~W tð Þ,
dY tð Þ ¼ Q2X tð Þ þA
Τ
1Y tð Þ þA
Τ
2
bY tð Þ þ CΤ1Z tð Þ þ ~F Τ5 bZ tð Þ þ ~CΤ1 ~Z tð Þ þ ~CΤ2 ~Z tð Þ þ ~F 4bu∗2 tð Þ dt
 Z tð ÞdW tð Þ  ~Z tð Þd ~W tð Þ, X 0ð Þ ¼ X0, Y Tð Þ ¼ G2X Tð Þ:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(67)
Noting Eq. (59), we have






bX tð Þ þ BΤ2Y tð Þ þ ~BΤ2 bY tð Þ þDΤ2Z tð Þ þ ~F Τ2 bZ tð Þ þ ~DΤ2 ~Z tð Þ þ ~~DΤ2 ~Z tð Þ ,
bu∗2 tð Þ ¼ N12 ~F Τ4 bX tð Þ þ B2 þ ~B2 	ΤbY tð Þ þ D2 þ ~F 2 	ΤbZ tð Þ þ ~D2 þ ~~D2 Τ ~Z tð Þ : (68)
Inserting Eq. (68) into Eq. (67), we get
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dX tð Þ ¼ A1X tð Þ þA2bX tð Þ þ ~F 1Y tð Þ þ B2bY tð Þ þ B3Z tð Þ þ B2bZ tð Þ þ ~B1~Z tð Þ þ ~B2~Z tð Þ dt
þ C1X tð Þ þ ~F 5bX tð Þ þ ~BΤ3Y tð Þ þD2bY tð Þ þ ~~D2Z tð Þ þD2bZ tð Þ þD3~Z tð Þ þ ~D2~Z tð Þ dW tð Þ
þ ~C1X tð Þ þ ~C2bX tð Þ þ ~BΤ1Y tð Þ þD3bY tð Þ þDΤ3Z tð Þ þDΤ3 bZ tð Þ þ ~F 3~Z tð Þ þ ~D3~Z tð Þ
 
d ~W tð Þ,
dY tð Þ ¼ Q2X tð Þ þ ~F 4bX tð Þ þAΤ1Y tð Þ þAΤ2 bY tð Þ þ ~CΤ1 ~Z tð Þ þ CΤ1Z tð Þ þ ~F Τ5 bZ tð Þ þ ~CΤ2 ~Z tð Þ
 
dt

































































































































































We need to decouple Eq. (69). Similar to Eq. (39), put
Y tð Þ ¼ P1 tð ÞX tð Þ þ P2 tð ÞbX tð Þ, t∈ 0;T½ , (71)
where P1 tð Þ,P2 tð Þ are differentiable, deterministic 2 2 matrix-valued functions with
P1 Tð Þ ¼ G2,P2 Tð Þ ¼ 0. Applying Lemma 5.4 in [21] to the forward equation in Eq. (35), we
obtain
dbX tð Þ ¼ A1 þA2 	bX tð Þ þ ~F 1 þ B2 bY tð Þ þ B3 þ B2 bZ tð Þ þ ~B1 þ ~B2 ~Z tð Þh idt
þ ~C1 þ ~C2
 bX tð Þ þ ~BΤ1 þD3
 bY tð Þ þ DΤ3 þD3 bZ tð Þ þ ~F 3 þ ~D3 ~Z tð Þ
 
d ~W tð Þ,




Applying Itô’s formula to (3.31), we get
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dY tð Þ ¼ _P 1 þ P1A1 þ P1 ~F 1P1
 
X tð Þ þ
h
_P 2 þ P1A2 þ P1B2P1 þ P2 A1 þA2
 	n
þP2 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P1;þP1 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P2;þP2 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P2
ibX tð Þ þ P1B3Z tð Þ þ P1~B1~Z tð Þ
þ P1B2 þ P2 B3 þ B2
 h ibZ tð Þ þ P1~B2 þ P2 ~B1 þ ~B2 h i~Z tð Þodt




X tð Þ þ P1 ~F 5 þ P1B
Τ
3P2 þ P1D2 P1 þ P2ð Þ
h ibX tð Þ þ P1 ~~D2Z tð Þn
þP1D2bZ tð Þ þ P1D3~Z tð Þ þ P1 ~D2~Z tð ÞodW tð Þ



















P2 þ P2 ~C1 þ ~C2
 
;þP1D3P1
bX tð Þ þ P1DΤ3Z tð Þ þ P1 ~F 3~Z tð Þ
þ P1D
Τ
3 þ P2 D
Τ
3 þD3




d ~W tð Þ






















dtþ Z tð ÞdW tð Þ þ ~Z tð Þd ~W tð Þ:
(73)
Comparing dW tð Þ and d ~W tð Þ on both sides of Eq. (73), we have




X tð Þ þ P1 ~F 5 þ P1B
Τ
3P2 þ P1D2 P1 þ P2ð Þ
h ibX tð Þ
þ P1
~~D2Z tð Þ þ P1D2bZ tð Þ þ P1D3~Z tð Þ þ P1 ~D2~Z tð Þ,





















bX tð Þ þ P1DΤ3Z tð Þ
þ P1D
Τ
3 þ P2 D
Τ
3 þD3




Taking E jG1, t½ , we derive
bZ tð Þ ¼ P1 C1 þ ~F 5 þ P1 BΤ3 þD2 	P1 þ P1 BΤ3 þD2 	P2h ibX tð Þ
þ P1
~~D2 þD2
 bZ tð Þ þ P1 D3 þ ~D2 ~Z tð Þ,
b~Z tð Þ ¼ P1 ~C1 þ ~C2 þ P1 ~BΤ1 þD3
 


















þ P1 þ P2ð Þ D
Τ
3 þD3
 bZ tð Þ þ P1 þ P2ð Þ ~F 3 þ ~D3 ~Z tð Þ:
(75)
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Supposing that (I2 denotes the 2 2 unit matrix)
A2:2ð Þ ~N
1













P1 D3 þ ~D2
 





bZ tð Þ ¼ Σ0 P1;P2ð ÞbX tð Þ, ~Z tð Þ ¼ ~Σ0 P1;P2ð ÞbX tð Þ, (77)
where
Σ0 P1;P2ð Þ≔ ~N
1























P1 þ P2ð Þ
h i










2 P1 þ P2ð Þ




















Inserting Eq. (77) into Eq. (74), we have




X tð Þ þ P1 ~F 5 þ B
Τ
3P2;þD2 P1 þ P2ð Þ;þD2Σ0 P1;P2ð Þ
h
þ ~D2 ~Σ0 P1;P2ð Þ
ibX tð Þ þ P1 ~~D2Z tð Þ þ P1D3~Z tð Þ,




X tð Þ þ P2 ~C1 þ ~C2
 
























~F 3 þ ~D3
  
P1 ~D2 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ




2 ≔ I2  P1
~~D2
 1












2 P1D3  P1
~F 3
 1
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we get




2 P1 C1 þ B
Τ
































~F 5 þ B
Τ






















þ P1~C2 þ P1D
Τ




P1D2Σ0 P1;P2ð Þ þ P1 ~D
Τ
3 þ P2
~F 3 þ ~D3
  







~F 5 þ B
Τ






























P1D2Σ0 P1;P2ð Þ þ P1 ~D
Τ
3 þ P2
~F 3 þ ~D3
  







~F 5 þ B
Τ







Comparing the coefficients of dt in Eq. (73) and putting Eqs. (77) and (81) into them, we get
0 ¼ _P 1 þ P1A1 þA
Τ
1P1 þ P1










P2 þ P2 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P1 þ P1 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P2
þ P2 ~F 1 þ B2
 
P2 þ P1A2 þA
Τ
2






~Σ2 P1;P2ð Þ þ ~F
Τ






~B2 þ P2 ~B1 þ ~B2
  
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Note that the system of Riccati equations (83) is not standard, and its solvability is open. Due to
some technical reason, we can not obtain the solvability of it now. However, in some special
case, P1 tð Þ and P2 tð Þ are not coupled. Then we can first solve the first equation of P1 tð Þ, then
that of P2 tð Þ by standard Riccati equation theory. We will not discuss for the space limit. And
we will consider the general solvability of Eq. (83) in the future.
Instituting Eqs. (77) and (81) into Eq. (68), we obtain





















2 P1 þ P2ð Þ
þDΤ2Σ2 P1;P2ð Þ þ
~F
Τ











and the optimal “state” X ¼ x∗; pð ÞΤ of the leader satisfies
dX tð Þ ¼
h
A1 þ ~F 1P1 þ B3Σ1 P1;P2ð Þ þ ~B1 ~Σ1ðP1;P2Þ
i
X tð Þ þ
h
A2 þ ~F 1P2 þ B2 P1 þ P2ð Þ
n
þB3Σ2 P1;P2ð Þ þ B2Σ0ðP1;P2Þ þ ~B1 ~Σ2ðP1;P2Þ þ ~B2 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ
ibX tð Þodt





X tð Þ þ
h
~F 5 þ ~B
Τ
3
P2 þD2 P1 þ P2ð Þ


þ ~~D2Σ2 P1;P2ð Þ þD2 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ
















1P2 þD3 P1 þ P2ð Þ






~Σ2ðP1;P2Þ þ ~D3 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ
ibX tð Þd ~W tð Þ,




where bX is governed by
dbX tð Þ ¼ A1 þA2 þ ~F 1 þ B2  P1 þ P2ð Þ þ B3Σ1ðP1;P2Þ þ ~B1 ~Σ1ðP1;P2Þh
þB3Σ2 P1;P2ð Þ þ B2Σ0ðP1;P2Þ þ
~B1
~Σ2ðP1;P2Þ þ ~B2 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ
ibX tð Þdt














~Σ2ðP1;P2Þ þ ~D3 ~Σ0ðP1;P2Þ
bX tð Þd ~W tð Þ,




We summarize the above analysis in the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.2 Let (A2.1)(A2.3) hold, P1 tð Þ;P2 tð Þð Þ satisfy Eq. (83), bX be the G1, t-adapted solution
to Eq. (86), and X be the F t-adapted solution to Eq. (85). Define Y;Z; ~Z
 	
by Eqs. (71) and (81),
respectively. Then Eq. (69) holds, and u∗2 given by Eq. (84) is a feedback optimal control of the leader.
Finally, the optimal control u∗1 of the follower can also be represented in a nonanticipating way.
In fact, by Eq. (47), noting Eqs. (68), (71), and (77), we have






1 tð Þbx∗ tð Þ þ ~S tð Þbu∗2 tð Þ þ BΤ1 bφ∗ tð Þ þ ~DΤ1 β∗ tð Þ 
¼  ~N
1




 bX tð Þ þ ~S tð Þbu∗2 tð Þ þ 0 BΤ1 	bY tð Þ þ 0 ~D Τ1 ~Z tð Þh i
¼  ~N
1





 ~S tð ÞN12 ½
~F
Τ
4 þ B2 þ
~B2
 	Τ


















which is observable for the follower.
Remark 3.3 When we consider the complete information case, that is, ~W ð Þ disappears and
G1, t ¼ F t, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 coincide with Theorems 2.3 and 3.3 in Yong [13].
4. Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have studied a leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric
information. This kind of game problem possesses several attractive features. First, the game
problem has the Stackelberg feature, which means the two players play as different roles
during the game. Thus the usual approach to deal with game problems, such as [6–8, 10],
where the two players act as equivalent roles, does not apply. Second, the game problem has
the asymmetric information between the two players, which was not considered in [3, 13, 14].
In detail, the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that
available to the leader. Stochastic filtering technique is introduced to compute the optimal
filtering estimates for the corresponding adjoint processes, which act as the solution to some
FBSDFE. Third, the Stackelberg equilibrium is represented in its state feedback form for the LQ
problem under some appropriate assumptions. Some new conditional mean-field FBSDEs and
system of Riccati equations are introduced to deal with the leader’s LQ problem.
In principle, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 provide a useful tool to seek Stackelberg equilibrium. As a
first step in this direction, we apply our results to the LQ problem to obtain explicit solutions.
We hope to return to the more general case in our future research. It is worthy to study the
closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for our problem, as well as the solvability of the system of
Riccati equations. These challenging topics will be considered in our future work.




Jingtao Shi would like to thank the book editor for his/her comments and suggestions. Jingtao
Shi also would like to thank Professor Guangchen Wang from Shandong University and
Professor Jie Xiong from Southern University of Science and Technology, for their effort and
discussion during the writing of this chapter.
Notes
The main content of this chapter is from the following two published article papers: (1) Shi, J.T.,
Wang, G.C., & Xiong, J. (2016). Leader-follower stochastic differential games with asymmetric
information and applications. Automatica, Vol. 63, 60–73. (2) Shi, J.T., Wang, G.C., & Xiong, J.
(2017). Linear-quadratic stochastic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information.
Science China Information Sciences, Vol. 60, 092202:1–15.
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